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Introduction 
The Politics of Original Intention 
At 2:oo PM, on Friday, October 2 3, 1987, the United States Senate com-
mitted what many considered then - and what many still consider today -
to be an unforgivable political and constitutional sin. Wielding their power 
to advise and consent on presidential nominations to the federal courts, the 
members of the upper house voted 58-42 not to confirm Judge Robert H . 
Bork to the Supreme Court of the United States, the post for which Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan had nominated him nearly four months earlier. The 
vote, which was the largest margin of defeat in history for a nominee to the 
Supreme Court, concluded one of the most tumultuous political battles in 
the history of the republic. 1 
The Senators perhaps had every reason to believe that that would be 
the end of the story. However ugly it had been, however much time it had 
taken, Judge Bark's defeat was only one more routine sacrifice to partisan 
politics. But time would prove wrong anyone who actually thought that. The 
unprecedented vote against his confirmation reflected something far more 
fundamental than an ordinary partisan standoff. The battle over Bork was 
politically transformative, its constitutional lessons enduring. 
Bork, of course, was not the first or the only nominee to the high court 
to be denied confirmation. From the days of President Washington, twenty-
nine others had been rejected.2 But the Bark confirmation fight was historic, 
and what made it so was that the Senate had chosen to deny confirmation 
1 133 Cong. Rec. 14,985, I 5,on (1987). For accounts of the Bork hearings and their political 
implications, see Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of 
the Law (New York: The Free Press, 1990), pp. 269- 355; Ethan Bronner, Battle for Justice: 
How the Bork Nomination Shook America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), pp. 208-327; 
and Eugene W. H ickok, Jr., and Gary L. McDowell, Justice vs. Law: Courts and Politics in 
Americmz Society (New York: The Free Press, 1993), pp. q B- 162. 
2 Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Appointments from Washington to Clinton (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 
p. 13. 
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to a nominee whose professional qualifications, legal abilities, and personal 
integrity were never in question.J Instead, the Senate rejected his judicial 
philosophy, even though that philosophy had been the received tradition in 
the Anglo-American legal system for hundreds of years. His jurisprudence 
was what has come to be called originalism, the belief that judges and justices 
in their interpretations of the Constitution must be bound by the original 
intentions of its framers. 
In the end, Bork was rejected on the basis of his beliefs about the limited 
nature and circumscribed extent of the judicial power he would wield as 
a justice on the Supreme Court. The issue that united the judge's critics in 
their scorched-earth opposition to his nomination was the fact that in his 
sober constitutional jurisprudence there was no room for any airy talk about 
a general right to privacy, allegedly unwritten constitutions, vague notions 
of unenumerated rights, or what the progressive Justice Hugo Black once 
derided as "any mysterious and uncertain natural law concept."4 In partic-
ular, Bork was denied a seat on the highest court because of his unfaltering 
belief in what Chief Justice John Marshall once called "the most sacred rule 
of interpretation," the idea that it is "the great duty of a judge who construes 
an instrument . .. to find the intention of its makers." 5 
For Bork, originalism was the only, or at least the primary, means of 
interpretation that can accord with a written and ratified constitution of 
3 During the Senate confirmation hearings on the nomination, it was repeatedly recalled that 
former Chief Justice Warren Burger had recently described Judge Bark as being without 
question the most highly qualified candidate to have been nominated to the Supreme Court 
in Burger's professional lifetime- a lifetime, it is worth noting, that would have included the 
appointments of some of the giants of the Supreme Court such as Benjamin Cardozo (193 2.-
38), Hugo Black (1937-71), Felix Frankfurter (1939-62.), and Robert H. Jackson (1941-54). 
For years, Bork had been a formidable intellectual presence in American legal circles, both 
public and scholarly. He had been solicitor general of the United States, a Yale Law School 
professor, a scholar whose groundbreaking work in the field of antitrust law was widely 
acclaimed, and, most recently, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, where none of his opinions had ever been overturned by the Supreme 
Court and where, on several occasions, his dissenting opin ions had been adopted on appeal 
as the majority view by rhe Supreme Court. When pressed during his own testimony at the 
confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Burger never qualified his expansive praise of Bark; and 
he was far from being alone in making such an assessment of the nominee. Nomination of 
Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings 
Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, rooth Cong., r•' sess. 33 (1987), pp. 2.096-
2.II7. Hereinafter cited as Hearings. Burger insisted that Bark was a "very sound lawyer, 
and a very fair judge, on the whole record. " Moreover, he said, "I surely do not understand 
the suggestion that he is not in the mainstream of American constitutional doctrine." Ibid., 
pp. 2.101, 2.!04. 
4 Dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), 52.2.. 
5 Gerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 167-169. 
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limited and enumerated powers. In his view, " the framers' intentions ... are 
the sole legitimate premise from which constitutional analysis may proceed." 
Constitutionalism and the rule of law, if those ideas were to mean anything, 
Bork believed, had to mean that " the moral content of law must be given 
by the morality of the framer or the legislator, never by the morality of the 
judge. "6 It could never be legitimate in a constitutional democracy for a 
judge as a matter of interpretation to substitute his own moral judgment for 
the considered moral judgments of the legislator or the Founder as expressed 
in the written law. To his critics, this view meant that Judge Bork lacked 
what they argued was proper " judicial temperament, " and put him outside 
what they insisted was " the mainstream" of legal opinion/ 
In a sense, the critics were right. They feared- and probably correctly-
that his jurisprudential approach to constitutional law would almost cer-
tainly threaten the liberal tradition of expansive interpretation that had 
begun in earnest when Earl Warren ascended to the center chair over thirty 
years earlier. The Warren Court, after all, was praised by Bork's most com-
mitted critics for having taught more than one generation of lawyers and 
judges, in the words of an early supporter of the Warren Court's activism, 
that there need be "no theoretical gulf between law and morality," and that 
the Supreme Court was the branch of the federal government best equipped 
to speak " the language of idealism" for the nation. The result was nothing 
less than a "revolutionary" jurisprudential stance in which the historic writ-
ten Constitution is to be supplemented or supplanted by judicial recourse 
to an allegedly unwritten constitution of a higher law that is in its essence 
morally evolutionary. 8 
This notion of a "living" constitution denies that there is any settled 
fundamental meaning to the Constitution whereby the politics of the nation 
may be ordered and guided; rather, it embraces and celebrates quite the 
opposite view, that judges should redefine the meaning of the Constitution 
over time according to their own "fresh moral insight. "9 The goal of judicial 
power after the Warren Court was no longer merely securing constitutional 
6 Robert H. Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law (Washington, DC: American 
Enrerprise Institute, 1984), pp. 10, II. 
7 See Laurence H . Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court: How the Choice of Supreme Court 
Justices Shapes Our History (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 106-11.4. 
8 J. Skelly Wright, "Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court," 
Harvard Law Review 84 (197o-7I): 769, 8o4, 8o4. The intellectual relationship between 
Alexander M. Bickel and Robert Bork that grew during their time together on the faculty of 
the Yale Law School is given a masterful consideration by Johnathan O'Neill in "Shaping 
Modern Constitutional Theory: Bickel and Bork Confront the Warren Court," Review of 
Politics 65 (2003): 325-351. 
9 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1977), p. 137· 
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or legal rights -even judicially created ones. Rather, the goal had become 
the "moral evolution" of the nation to be led by the courts. 10 
At the most important level, the Bork defeat was about more than merely 
the partisan and ideological rejection of one highly qualified nominee to 
the Supreme Court. It was the very public affirmation by the Senate of this 
new ideological theory of moralistic judging that had been developing for 
quite some time- even before the advent of the Warren Court, in fact. And 
that new theory of judging was completely at odds with the great historical 
tradition of a jurisprudence of original intention of which Bork was so 
visible a part. n The defeat of Robert Bork was historic for what was clearly 
in danger of being lost when it came to a public understanding of the nature 
and extent of judicial power. 
What was at stake was the original view of the Constitution, an under-
standing that took seriously the importance of its being a written document 
the terms of which are to be deemed permanent until and unless changed 
by the "solemn and authoritative act" of formal amendment. 12 This is the 
understanding that lies at the core of what may with propriety be called the 
Founders' Constitution. And it is this idea of a constitution at once funda-
mental and permanent that is most in danger of being eroded by the new 
idea of moral judging under an evolving constitution that so fully infuses 
contemporary constitutional law and theory. 
The Founders were concerned above all else with the abuses of political 
power. No one among them argued for unlimited power that would autho-
rize government institutions to go forth and do justice: not the legislature, 
not the executive, and, most assuredly, not the judiciary. The Founders knew 
the dangers of arbitrariness in the exercise of power and were dedicated to 
the idea of limited government rooted in a constitution of clearly enumerated 
powers. They were committed to the proposition, as Chief Justice Marshall 
put it in Marbury v. Madison, that a written constitution is nothing less 
than " the greatest improvement on political institutions. "'3 And, perhaps 
most important, they believed with Justice Joseph Story that the Consti-
tution should have "a fixed, uniform, permanent construction. It should 
be ... not dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but 
the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever. "'4 As students of Marshall and 
Story, originalists such as Judge Bork argue for the recovery of the Founders' 
'
0 Michael Perry, The Constitution, the Court, and Human Rights (New Haven, Cf: Yale 
University Press, 198o), p. 101. 
u See Raoul Berger, "'Original Intention' in Historical Perspective," George Washington Law 
Review 54 (1985-86): 2.96-3 37. 
a Jacob Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, Cf: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 
No. 78, p. 52.8. Hereinafter cited as The Federalist. 
'3 5 U.S. 13 7 (1803), 176. 
'4 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 2. vols. (3'd ed.; 
Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1858), !.42.6.303. Citation indicates volume, section, and 
page number. 
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Constitution and the idea that interpretation, in order to be legitimate, must 
be rooted in the text and the original intention behind that text. ' 5 
While this view may be more modest than the current dominant view, 
it is also safer, constitutionally and politically. For at bottom it accepts 
a basic truth of American constitutionalism. As James Wilson said at the 
Constitutional Convention, "laws may be unwise, may be dangerous, may 
be destructive . . . and yet not be unconstitutional.'' 16 This older view of the 
Constitution - the Constitution understood as positive law - was premised 
on the belief that when it came to interpreting the Constitution there were 
limits to the influence of higher law, limits to judicial recourse to an allegedly 
unwritten constitution in interpreting the written text. 
Where the Constitution's framers and ratifiers intended to protect rights, 
so argue the originalists, the document does so - clearly and simply. Where it 
is silent, it is silent. The due process clauses are not, nor were they intended to 
be, judicial wild cards whereby contemporary moral, political, or economic 
theories may be made to trump the Constitution's original meaning; the 
Ninth Amendment is not a statement of unenumerated rights so fundamental 
and sweeping as to render all the other rights explicitly mentioned in the 
text superfluous; most of all, Article III, which creates the federal judicial 
power, is not the primary means whereby rights are to find their protection. 
It would have struck the Founders not only as dangerous but as bizarre to 
have expected the security of their rights to depend upon a judiciary willing 
to plunge into a moral discourse unattached to the constitutional text and 
divorced from the intentions that lie behind the document itself. 17 
A jurisprudence of original intention appreciates the design and objects 
of the Constitution. It unflinchingly recognizes the limitations of popular 
government - such as the possibility of majority tyranny - and the need 
to secure individual rights. But it also denies that good government and the 
sound security of rights are ever to be expected from any body of judges even 
if (or perhaps especially if) dedicated to the judicial pursuit of an allegedly 
higher law contained within an unwritten constitution. The Constitution 
'5 As Joseph Story put it, the " fundamental maxim .. . in the interpretation of ... positive laws 
is that the intention ... is to be followed. This intention is to be gathered from the words, 
the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, and the spirit and reason are 
to be ascertained, not from vague conjecture, but from the motives and language apparent 
on the face of the law." Joseph Story, "Law, Legislation, Codes," in Francis Lieber, ed., 
Encyclopedia Americana, 13 vols. (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1844), VII: 576- 592, 
p. 576. This essay has been reprinted in James McClellan, Joseph Story and the American 
Constitution (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), p. 365. 
r
6 Max Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention, 4 vols. (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1937), II: 73 · Hereinafter cited as Records of the Federal Con· 
vention. 
'7 On the facts of the relationship between framers' limited institutional provisions for the 
judiciary and their expectations of its role, see Gary L. McDowell, "Bork Was the Begin-
ning: Constitutional Moralism and the Politics of Federal Judicial Selection," University of 
Richmond Law Review 39 (2005): 8o9, 813-817. 
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with its carefully contrived institutional balances and checks was devised 
precisely to supply, as James Madison said in The Federalist, "the defect of 
better motives.'"8 Sturdy institutions replaced good intentions as the source 
of good government in the Founders' new science of politics. To allow the 
courts to enter the realm of substantive policy making denies the logic and 
the limits of the most basic idea of written constitutions. Distrusting the 
moral impulses of judges is not morally cynical; it is politically prudent. 
The only way the inherently undemocratic power of judicial review can 
be reconciled with the demands of republican government is by keeping it 
tied to the written text of the fundamental law. Only by conforming to the 
"intention of the people"'9 as expressed in the document can the judges legit-
imate what they do; as they range further from the text and intention, their 
power becomes increasingly suspect. "The Court," as Justice Byron White 
once argued, "is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when 
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable 
roots in the language or design of the Constitution.'' 2 0 
This is the essential dilemma posed by the new anti-originalist jurispru-
dence, the wide-ranging moralistic judging rooted in a so-called " living" 
constitution that has come to characterize the exercise of contemporary 
judicial power. Not only does such judicial activism violate the separation 
of powers and make the judges policy makers at a given moment, but over 
time it weakens the role of the Court by undermining its only claim to legiti-
macy- that when it speaks it is only enforcing the clear will of the sovereign 
people as already expressed in their Constitution. 
As Madison said of the legislatures of his day, so might it be said about 
the courts of the present: the judiciary has "every where extended the sphere 
of its activity and draw[n] all power into its impetuous vortex. •m Where 
the Founders could say with confidence that "[j]udges .. . are not presumed 
to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures, "22 
more recent generations have come to believe that judges are indeed quite 
well equipped to deal with the most sensitive and politically controversia l 
areas of policy. And as the courts have become ever more immersed in the 
"mere policy of public measures," the choice of who shall wield those vast 
extra-constitutional powers has become ever more politically important, 
with the sad result - made clear in the Bork confirmation fight- that the 
federal courts are no longer to be left above the fray. 
18 The Federalist, No. 51, p. 349· 
19 The Federalist, No. 78, p. 52.5 . 
20 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (19 82.), 194· 
21 The Federalist, N o. 48, p. 33 3· 
22 Nathaniel Ghorum in the Constitutional Conventio n, Records of the Federal Convention, 
II: 73 · 
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H ow did this state of affairs come about? It is not enough to say that the 
present dilemma is the result of power-grabbing judges bent on wielding their 
powers in order to achieve the policy ends they prefer. There is some of that, 
of course; but the whole answer is more complicated. The story involves not 
just judicial usurpation but also Congress's abdication of its responsibility to 
shape the judicial process by rules and regulations and to make exceptions 
to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. In many ways, Congress has been more 
than willing to leave the federal courts to their own devices. :1.3 
But neither does the whole answer lie simply in the institutional relation-
ship between the judiciary and the legislature. It has also involved something 
far more subtle. Since the last third of the nineteenth century there has been 
a change in the ideas about judicial power. The new ideas have been largely 
created and encouraged not by the courts themselves but by the scholarly 
community. Legal scholars have become adept at creating new theories of 
interpretation, and new understandings of what constitutionalism gener-
ally and the United States Constitution in particular demand of the judges. 
Indeed, the new dominant anti-originalist, aconstitutional constitutionalism 
has its roots as much in the classroom as in the courtroom. As Edward S. 
Corwin once put it, " if judges make law, so do commentators.":1.4 At the 
head of the fight against Robert Bark's nomination was a phalanx of pro-
fessors that was able to persuade the public and the Senate that Bork's orig-
inalism was outside the "mainstream" of legal opinion that the professors 
themselves had helped to divert from its long-established, traditional path ... 5 
More important, in a sense, than what led to the current state of affairs 
is what might reasonably be done about it. What might help restore an 
appreciation for the Constitution's original institutional design and thus 
a firmer understanding of the true nature and proper extent of judicial 
interpretation? It is in this sense that the vote over Judge Bark's nomination 
to the Supreme Court is not just a matter of quaint historical interest but the 
first great battle in the contemporary war for the Constitution- a continuing 
war that must be won if true self-government as envisioned by the Founders 
is to prevail. Time has shown that originalism as a theory of constitutional 
interpretation remains very much alive; Bark was defeated, but his central 
idea was not. That theory of interpretation and its implicit belief in restrained 
judging continues to guide those who believe that the inherent arbitrariness 
of government by judiciary is not the same thing as the rule of law. 
•J See Gary L. McDowell, Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial 
Power (Baron Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988). 
'4 Edward S. Corwin, "Review: The Law of the American Constitution, by Charles K. 
Burdick," Michigan Law Review 22 (1923): 84, p. 84. 
•s For a listing of those in the legal academy who opposed the Bork nomination, see Hearings, 
pp. 1335-1341, 1342- 1345,335I-3354> 3355-3412. 
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Changing the public mind is never quick or easy. To recover the Founders' 
Constitution it will be necessary to demonstrate that recourse to original 
intention - John Marshall's "most sacred rule of interpretation" - is the 
true mainstream flowing from the well-established legal and constitutional 
traditions of the nation. This book is an attempt at that recovery of the 
intellectual and philosophic foundations of that jurisprudence of original 
intention as the most sound approach to judicial interpretation under our 
constitution of enumerated and limited powers and liberties. 
